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Abstract
Since the end of the bipolar era, the military activism of several Western powers has raised
questions about parliamentary control, fostering growing research and analyses on the
features, drivers and consequences of the different kinds of oversight exercised by
legislative assemblies. Within this scholarly debate, this article focuses on the under-
studied case of Italy. How did Italian parties vote on military operations abroad in the
post-Cold War era? In order to answer this question, the article presents the first detailed
and comprehensive set of data on parliamentary votes over the deployment of the Italian
armed forces in the post-Cold War era (i.e. from the beginning of the 1990s to the recent
operation against ISIL). Thanks to this extensive new empirical material, the article
assesses selected arguments developed by the literature on political parties and foreign
policy, paving the way for further research.
Keywords: parliamentary oversight; military deployment; partisanship; foreign policy; Italy;
parliamentary war powers
In January 2018, the Italian parliament approved an increase in military presence
in Libya and the deployment of hundreds of troops in Niger (Scherer 2018). The
main centre-left and centre-right parties supported all the planned military
operations abroad, which have constantly been a key aspect of post-Cold War
Italian foreign policy (Brighi 2013; Carati and Locatelli 2017; Ignazi et al. 2012).
However, despite the significant military contributions provided by Italy to
regional and international security in the last decades, the overall attention devoted
to the debates and votes regarding these deployments within the legislative
assembly (as well as the role of parliamentary oversight) has been extremely
limited.
This article seeks to contribute to the growing literature on ‘parliamentary war
powers’, presenting a brand-new data set of parliamentary votes on the deployment
of the Italian armed forces in the post-Cold War era. After the end of the bipolar
era, the military activism of several Western powers has raised questions about
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parliamentary control, fostering increasing research and analyses on features,
drivers and consequences of different kinds of formal and informal oversight (or
lack thereof) exerted by legislative assemblies over security and defence policy. In
line with this mounting scholarly debate (Auerswald and Saideman 2014; Dieterich
et al. 2010; Mello 2014; Peters and Wagner 2011; Wagner et al. 2017), we focus on
the under-studied case of Italy. More specifically, the article answers the following
research question: how did Italian parties vote on military operations abroad in the
post-Cold War era?
The findings allow an assessment of whether the Italian case matches the
expectations of the literature. Indeed, we find that parties are in general more
supportive than supposed. Features of the law-making process, government–
opposition dynamics and ideological leaning all contribute to explain whether a
party votes in favour of a military operation or not. In particular, in line with
previous literature (Wagner et al. 2017), we observe that party support follows a
curvilinear model on the left–right axis: centrist parties are more in favour of troop
deployments abroad than those at the extremes. We conclude that future research
might seek to determine if other cleavages such as green-alternative-libertarian vs.
traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (GAL–TAN) (Hooghe et al. 2002) may better
explain such parliamentary votes.
The goals of the article are threefold. First, we present the first detailed and
comprehensive analysis of parliamentary votes regarding Italian military deploy-
ment, from the war in Iraq in 1990 to the most recent operations in the Medi-
terranean and in Iraq against ISIL. Second, the article assesses selected arguments
developed by the literature on political parties and foreign policy in the Italian case.
Then, we derive additional hypotheses from the data that can be tested in further
studies, advancing new perspectives on political parties and security issues. Third,
we contribute to the limited debate on Italian defence, illustrating the evolution of
deployment votes in a cross-time analysis.
The aim of the article is not to trace in formal ways causal relations between
variables but to provide a detailed picture of the ways through which Italian parties
voted on missions, emphasizing recurring patterns. The article is structured as
follows. After reviewing the literature on political parties and foreign policy, we
present the Italian case, the main arguments and the methods adopted in the data
collection. The results of the empirical analysis are reported through various tables.
Finally, we discuss to what extent the findings allow a confirmation (or confuta-
tion) of the selected arguments on parties and military operations, paving the way
for further research.
Political parties and foreign policy: a controversial debate
According to Juliet Kaarbo (2015: 195), foreign policy analysis (FPA) research ‘has
consistently shown the significance of domestic politics and decision making to
issues central to international politics’, including international military interven-
tions. However, comparative politics and international relations (IR) have generally
devoted limited attention to parliaments and parties in foreign and security policy.
While in international relations structural realism has strongly denied the role of
domestic factors as explaining variables of international behaviour, conflicts among
2 Fabrizio Coticchia and Valerio Vignoli
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parties over foreign and security policies have seldom been taken up by scholars of
comparative politics (Wagner et al. 2017). Nevertheless, a ‘domestic turn’ in
international relations (Kaarbo 2015) has fostered a growing interest in how
domestic political and decision-making factors affect actors’ choices and policies.
The established ‘democratic peace theory’ (Maoz and Russet 1993), the post-Cold
War blurring of boundaries between domestic and foreign policy (Raunio and
Wagner 2017), as well as the increasingly involvement of parliaments in matters of
defence and security policy – such as peacekeeping or peace-building operations –
have surely encouraged such development.
Schematically, we can highlight three main axes of contention within the debate
on the consequences of domestic political processes on foreign policy behaviour.
To wit, the recent literature has explored how parties, parliaments and coalitions
affect foreign and defence policymaking.
First, scholars have attempted to ‘bring political parties in’ to the debate
(Schuster and Maier 2006). Brian Rathbun (2004) focused on partisanship in
foreign policy, emphasizing how national interest is not ‘given’ (but rather
defined by parties) and illustrating how different ideological roots can explain the
different propensity to intervene militarily. Along these lines, others (Bjereld and
Demker 2000; Schuster and Maier 2006) have stressed how ideology represents
the main source of party disagreement over foreign policy. Specifically, the ways
the party’s left/right positioning influences foreign and security policy have been
investigated, often presenting divergent findings. The classic approach – positing
‘doves’ on the left and ‘hawks’ on the right (Heffington 2018; Palmer et al. 2004)
– has been contested, highlighting, for instance, how support for military
operations abroad is ‘curvilinear’, increasing from the left to the centre right and
then declining again towards the radical right (Wagner et al. 2017). A more
nuanced picture on partisanship and foreign policy emerged from other studies
(Haesebrouck 2016), while membership of a party family represents a crucial
variable for several authors who examine parties at the EU level (Hix 1999).
Rather than focusing on the left–right cleavage, other scholars (Hooghe et al.
2002) have pointed out the relevance – also in foreign policy – of the so-called
GAL–TAN cleavage.
Second, and relatedly, several authors (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Oppermann
and Brummer 2014) have examined how coalition politics affects foreign policy,
assessing parties’ ideological positions (Clare 2010) and size in the parliament and
in the government (Oktay and Beasley 2016). For instance, Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan
Beasley (2008) have illustrated how junior parties may hijack vulnerable coalitions
in government, leading to an ‘extreme’ foreign policy. Kai Opperman and Klaus
Brummer (2014) have revealed how the saliency of the issue and the portfolio (e.g.
the control of a ministry relevant to foreign policy, etc.) play a role for parties in
coalition. In contrast, Fabrizio Coticchia and Jason Davidson (2018), focusing on
the case of Italy, have shown how junior radical parties may be reluctant to
threaten or force government collapse (because, for example, they fear that voters
will blame them for bringing the opposition into power). Along with the more
general findings of Wolfgang Wagner et al. (2017), we would expect a relatively
high level of cohesiveness among governing parties.
Government and Opposition 3
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Third, a literature on ‘parliamentary war powers’ has recently emerged
(Dieterich et al. 2010; Lagassè and Mello 2018; Peters and Wagner 2011; Wagner
et al. 2017), highlighting the variations in parliamentary control of post-Cold War
military dynamism, identifying the causes behind the differences (e.g. features of
the political system, the state’s international context, etc.), the benchmarks of par-
liamentary oversight (from complete exclusion to veto power) and the consequences
in terms of defence and security policy. Recent analyses (Mello and Peters 2018;
Raunio and Wagner 2017) have stressed the gaps that still need to be addressed in
the ‘parliamentary war powers’ literature, such as the excessive attention devoted to
formal powers (rather than to informal ones) or the limited interest in how par-
liaments oversee deployments. In this sense, analysing national parliaments’ scrutiny
over EU-led operations, Giovanna Bono (2005) has emphasized the impact of law-
making procedures and their timing in determining the balance between legislative
and executive. Above all, some cases appear particularly ambiguous and the findings
of existing research are still controversial. The complex evolution of the legislative
procedures across time, the persistence of informal and vague mechanisms and the
problematic access to the sources may all have contributed to the scant considera-
tions given to some countries within the growing debate on parliamentary war
powers. Italy surely represents one of these countries.
The case of Italy
The overall post-Cold War debate on Italian foreign and defence policy is still
limited. Recent literature has tried to understand the reasons for this shortcoming,
focusing on non-excluding factors such as the post-World War II history, political
culture and ‘pacifist’ public opinion (Carati and Locatelli 2017; Ignazi et al. 2012).
Despite this academic and public ‘indifference’, the transformation of Italian
defence after the fall of the Berlin Wall has been remarkable: Italian troops became
involved in many operations abroad (from Iraq and Somalia to the Balkans, from
Lebanon to Afghanistan and Libya), providing a noticeable contribution to mul-
tilateral institutions and to international security. Moreover, considerable defence
sector reforms have been undertaken, while the Italian military is now one of the
country’s most trusted institutions, largely because of its ‘peace missions’ (Battis-
telli et al. 2012).
Nevertheless, the attention paid to Italian parties and defence policy has gen-
erally remained inadequate. There are few studies on the nexus between parliament
and defence issues (Bono 2005; D’Amore 2001), on parties and coalition foreign
policy (Coticchia and Davidson 2018; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015) and almost none
on voting patterns across the entire post-Cold War period.1 Indeed, the above-
mentioned consequences of parliamentary oversight on defence policy have never
been examined in the case of Italy. Moreover, especially because of the significant
military contribution provided in recent decades and the widespread ‘pacifist
strategic culture’, Italy represents an excellent case in which to investigate parti-
sanship and foreign policy, assessing the supposed ‘curvilinear’ support for military
operations (Wagner et al. 2017). Finally, the ways through which parties’ affilia-
tions influence foreign policies have also been almost entirely ignored by the
literature and, thus, merit attention.
4 Fabrizio Coticchia and Valerio Vignoli
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At the same time, the few emerging perspectives on Italian parties and foreign
policy have never been examined through a large-N analysis of voting patterns on
the missions abroad. For instance, Maurizio Carbone (2007) illustrated
the domestic foundation of the Italian debate on foreign policy issues. Accordingly,
the support of political parties for a specific military mission depends more on the
contingencies of domestic political debate than on the nature or the goals of the
operations on the ground. Other authors have also scrutinized party culture and
ideology (Carati and Locatelli 2017; Ignazi et al. 2012), stressing the existence of a
bipartisan consensus over Italian military dynamism, based on a pacific, multi-
lateral and humanitarian narrative. But, as said, these views have never been
assessed through a comprehensive and cross-time analysis of voting patterns on
Italian military operations since the bipolar era.2
This article aims to fill this gap, providing a new data set of parliamentary votes
on Italian missions abroad, from the beginning of the 1990s to the current fight
against ISIL (2014 and beyond). Before presenting the results, it is worth briefly
summarizing the complex post-Cold War evolution of Italian legislation and
parliamentary oversight on missions abroad.
The Italian parliament and military operations
Scholars debated the competences of the Italian parliament regarding war powers,
the scope of which Dirk Peters and Wolfgang Wagner (2011) observe is ‘far from
being clear-cut’. While some have labelled Italy’s system one of ‘rigid parliamentary
control’ (Dieterich et al. 2010), others stress the parliament’s veto rights over the
executive (Mello 2014). In short, the Italian case remains ‘inconclusive’ (Peters and
Wagner 2011, 189), warranting further analysis.
The ‘lack of consensus’ (Mello 2014: 78) on Italian parliamentary war powers,
along with the topic’s intricacy, has obstructed a detailed analysis of Italian par-
liaments and military operations. A real turning point for the ways through which
the Italian parliament ‘controls’ the executive on military missions occurred only in
December 2016, when the first ‘legge quadro’ (comprehensive law) on military
missions was finally adopted, after more than 25 years of military deployment.3
The law openly explains the type of parliamentary oversight and the kinds of
missions allowed (Ronzitti 2017).
Before this law, the procedures adopted were manifold and ambiguous. In the
1990s the debate was focused on the interpretation of the articles of the con-
stitution pertaining to Italian involvement in ‘war’ and legislative–executive rela-
tions. The constitutional constraints were bypassed thanks to a specific
interpretation adopted in 1990–1 (during the crisis in Iraq) that refused to give the
designation ‘war’ to national military interventions of this type. Instead, they were
cast as ‘police operations’ that ‘aimed at providing a contribution to multilateral
institutions’, as stated in (the second part of) the widely quoted Article 11 of the
constitution. Then, Law 25/1997 required parliamentary approval of the delib-
erations on security and defence issues assumed by the cabinet, but the types of
such deliberations, as well as the nature of legislative approval, were not clearly
defined, leaving the executive with the ability to again bypass parliamentary
(ex ante) control.
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Thus, to improve the clarity of the whole procedure, the ‘Ruffino Resolution’
(7-01007) was approved (with a broad and bipartisan consensus) in 2001, intro-
ducing the prassi (custom) of voting on the (re)financing of missions. Through law
decrees the government informed (annually or every six months) parliament about
operations abroad.4 In practice, oversight remained limited because the decree did
not allow for proper and detailed debates, with information on the financing, rules
of engagement (RoE), tasks and caveats lacking. Thus, it was extremely compli-
cated to vote against one mission, as it would stop funding for all the others.
Consequently, parliamentary approval via legislation (to convert an initial execu-
tive decree) on a new mission often occurred after the launch of a mission.
In sum, until 2016 Italy could be coded as ‘without a prior veto’ for troop
deployment. After the new law, the parliament has always debated and voted the
Italian operations abroad.5 As stated, the law defines in detail the types of missions
allowed, introducing what seems an ex ante veto, affirming that ‘the Chambers
authorize every year the international missions’.6
Current research (Coticchia and Moro 2017) is examining the consequences of
the vague pre-2016 procedures (e.g. granting autonomy to the executive, avoiding
audience costs and clear attribution of responsibility, thus fostering military acti-
vism). Yet, because of such complexity, almost none has collected data on voting
patterns related to all Italian post-Cold War military operations.
Selected arguments and data collection7
In line with the above-mentioned literature on political parties and foreign and
security policy, as well as the post-Cold War debate on Italian defence, we can
emphasize five shared arguments that can be assessed in the case of Italy. As noted,
the scholarly debate has focused on the consequences of different parliamentary
oversight on defence and security policy, the relationship between partisanship and
foreign policy, and the ways through which parties’ affiliation (government/
opposition) affects foreign and defence policy. Moreover, the supposed Italian
bipartisan consensus on military operations abroad and the domestic foundation of
the Italian debate on foreign policy issues represent crucial perspectives in the
current national literature. By examining voting patterns on Italian military
operations with the first comprehensive data set collected, we evaluate for Italy the
validity of the arguments deriving from such debate.
First, following scholars who have highlighted the vital role of ‘parliaments for
the formulation and implementation of security policy’ (Mello and Peters 2018: 3),
one can suppose that the peculiar features of the law-making process influence the
extent of parliamentary support for military operations abroad (MOAs). For
instance, we can expect a different degree of backing according to the procedure
adopted for the votes (e.g. refinancing, legislative decrees, etc.). Second, partisan-
ship has been largely reported as a crucial variable affecting voting patterns in
foreign and defence policy. Thus, in line with the findings of recent analyses
concerning several European countries (Wagner et al. 2017), we can expect that the
curvilinear model – rather than the traditional left–right (doves/hawks) dimension
(Palmer et al. 2004) – would also predict well the Italian parties’ behaviour. Indeed,
the pacifism of the far-left Italian parties (Coticchia and De Simone 2016), the
6 Fabrizio Coticchia and Valerio Vignoli
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widespread support by centre-left and centre-right coalitions for the post-Cold
War Italian armed forces (Battistelli et al. 2012) and the generally low saliency
attributed to defence issues by Italian right-wing parties (Calossi and Coticchia
2009) seem to be ideal premises for supporting the curvilinear model.
Third, as widely reported by recent literature (Carati and Locatelli 2017; Ignazi
et al. 2012), we would assume the existence of a large and cross-time bipartisan
consensus on the deployment of Italian troops. The expectations regarding such
consensus also resonate well with the recent literature that has illustrated how
parties can collude to lessen debates on missions, avoiding accountability (Lagassè
and Mello 2018).
Fourth, in accordance with authors who have demonstrated how MPs’ voting on
foreign and defence policy is deeply influenced by their affiliation with either the
ruling majority or the opposition (Wagner et al. 2017), we would expect mem-
bership of government to have a significant impact on the voting patterns of Italian
parties.
Finally, coming back to the Italian literature, and specifically those studies that
have revealed how foreign and defence policy issues are closely related to the
contingencies of domestic political debate (Carbone 2007), we can assume that
‘instrumental’ parliamentary dynamics (Calossi and Coticchia 2009) play a fun-
damental role. For instance, we can highlight cases of U-turn behaviour by
opposition parties aiming to exploit the contradictions of majority coalitions by
voting against a mission that has been previously supported.
As stated, to assess the above-mentioned arguments empirically, we built a
completely original data set, consisting of 96 votes that took place in the Italian
parliament on MOAs. Within this group of votes, 65 took place in the Camera dei
Deputati (Chamber of Deputies) and 31 in the Senato (Senate).8 In terms of those
acts with legal force, law decrees constitute the vast majority of the observations
(77), while there were 19 resolutions on the whole government’s foreign policy
approach. In terms of distribution across time, votes varied between a minimum of
one to a maximum of eight per year. Unsurprisingly, the peaks were in years in
which major MOAs occurred, such as 1997 with the mission in Albania, 1999 with
Kosovo, 2003 with Iraq and, finally, 2011 with Libya. Forty-one votes took place
under a centre-left coalition and 47 under a centre-right majority. The remaining
eight votes were during ‘technocratic governments’ or grand coalitions.
The number of votes taken into consideration depends on both our methodo-
logical approach and the inherent limitations of the data availability. We selected a
time span extending from 1994 to 2016. On the one hand, we have examined the
post ‘Second Republic’ context after the collapse of the previous party system based
on the competition between the Christian Democrats and the Communists, the end
of the bipolar era, and the emerging role of media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi and his
Forza Italia (FI) movement (Bartolini et al. 2004).9 As political parties represent
our unit of analysis, taking 1994 as a starting point allows us to limit as much as
possible the variation in terms of label, number and ideology. Furthermore, the
previously mentioned comprehensive law regarding parliamentary oversight on
MOAs was ratified only in 2016. Thus, considering missions approved after this
date could be problematic because the new law will probably transform the ways in
which Italian parliament votes on troop deployment.
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Within our observations, we focused on 27 ‘key votes’ on the most relevant
military operations in which the country has taken part since the end of the Cold
War.10 The missions were selected, in line with existing literature on Italian defence
(Coticchia and Moro 2016; Ignazi et al. 2012), according to the following criteria:
number of troops deployed, resources committed, military contribution, duration
and relevance (in terms of public debate, military transformation and multinational
interoperability).11 Specifically, we considered nine missions: Operation Alba
(Albania, 1997), Allied Harbour (Kosovo, 1999), Enduring Freedom and
ISAF (Afghanistan 2001–14), Antica Babilonia (Iraq, 2003–6), Leonte/UNIFIL
(Lebanon, 2006–), Unified Protector (Libya, 2011), Prima Parthica (Iraq, 2014–)
and EUNAVFOR Med (Mediterranean, 2015–).12
Through our data set, we explored the behaviour of Italy’s ‘main political
parties’, selected according to their electoral success, representation in parliament
and presence in the governing coalitions. For the far left, we considered Rifon-
dazione Comunista (RC, Communist Refoundation) and the Partito dei Comunisti
Italiani (PdCI, Party of Italian Communists). For the socialist family, we analysed
the pivotal Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS, Democratic Party of the Left)
that changed its name in 1998 to Democratici di Sinistra and, in 2007, merged into
the Partito Democratico (PD, Democratic Party). The Christian democrats are
represented by the Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI, Italian People’s Party), which
contributed in 2002 to create La Margherita (Daisy), and by the Centro Cristiano
Democratico (CCD, Christian Democratic Centre) and Cristiani Democratici Uniti
(CDU, United Christian Democrats), which merged in 2002 in the Unione di
Centro (UDC, Union of the Centre). For the centre right, we have considered Forza
Italia, which between 2009 and 2013 took the name Popolo delle Libertà (People of
Freedom). The far right is represented by the Alleanza Nazionale (AN, National
Alliance) and the Lega Nord (LN, Northern League).
Empirical analysis
Overall, as illustrated by Figure 1, military operations received a remarkably high
level of parliamentary support in Italy.13 In fact, on average 80.1% of MPs backed
the deployment of the Italian armed forces abroad, while only 15.24% opposed it
and 4.56% abstained.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Yes No Abstentions
Figure 1. Parliamentary Support for Military Operations Abroad (1994–2016)
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Among Italian political parties, parliamentary support for MOAs is lowest at the
left, increasing towards the centre and slightly declining again to the right
(Figure 2).14
The two parties of the far left under consideration, RC and PdCI, display very low
levels of backing, 21.13% and 37.41%, respectively. The difference between them
originates in the fact that PdCI was formed – almost specifically – to support the
centre-left coalition government in 1998. It is worth noting how the main Italian
social democratic party has dramatically increased its support for participation in
military intervention over time. In fact, while the PDS/DS scores 60.80%, its suc-
cessor, the PD, reaches an astonishing 93.53%. All the Christian democratic parties
evince strong support for military deployment: PPI/Margherita (65.5%), the CCD/
CDU (80.60%) and UDC (93.65%). The lower level of average support from La
Margherita is due to its partnership with DS in the centre-left coalition, both in the
government and the opposition. FI/PdL was a loyal supporter of MOAs and regis-
tered 90.51% parliamentary backing. The far-right and post-fascist AN, which has
always formed a government with FI, also shows high levels of support (86.58%).
Despite also being part of the centre-right coalition, the regionalist and populist Lega
Nord was less supportive of the use of force outside Italian borders (58.88%).
Analysing the category of ‘key votes’, we show that the average percentage of
approval is slightly lower. In other words, ‘key votes’ were more contested. Indeed,
in our restricted sample of 27 observations, we register 68.6% parliamentary
support in comparison with the 80.21% of the remaining 69 votes. In contrast, the
level of opposition is around 10% higher while abstentions instead present similar
values (Figure 3).
Therefore, the level of parliamentary support decreased in the votes on single
and relevant MOAs, which have usually been approved through resolutions on
government communications. Conversely, the degree of approval increased in the
votes on the refinancing of multiple MOAs through decrees. By examining these
votes in detail, we can report how in eight out of 27 cases the level of support falls
below the threshold of 60% (Figure 4).
Most of the votes on Antica Babilonia (Iraq) and Unified Protector (Libya) were
particularly contested. In the eight votes regarding involvement in the Iraq War,
parliamentary support oscillated around 60%, while in the vote (in the Chamber of
RC
PdCI
PDS/DS
PD
PPI/Margherita
CCD/CDU
UDC FI/PdL AN
LN
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Left–Right
Figure 2. Average of Parties’ Parliamentary Support for MOAs (1994–2016)
Note: Party positioning along the left–right dimension is based on established literature on the issue (Benoit and
Laver 2006; Döring and Manow 2018).
Government and Opposition 9
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/g
ov
.2
01
8.
35
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 IP
 a
dd
re
ss
: 7
9.
16
.1
95
.7
6,
 o
n 
05
 N
ov
 2
01
8 
at
 1
3:
18
:1
7,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
Deputies) on Italy’s contribution to the multilateral intervention in the Libyan civil
war, the centre-right executive’s resolution passed with only a narrow margin of
seven votes. However, centre-left governments also experienced high levels of
parliamentary opposition on MOAs on the two missions in the Balkans: Alba and
Allied Harbour. Support for the government’s initiative in Albania was only 56% in
the Chamber of Deputies, while during three votes in the same chamber on the
operation in Kosovo support never exceeded 65%. Furthermore, on 21 February
2007, Romano Prodi’s centre-left government failed to reach a majority for the
renewal of the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan because of the cohesive
opposition from the centre-right coalition and crucial defections among its own
ranks. This constitutes the only circumstance in our data set in which a post-Cold
War Italian government was defeated on a military operation abroad.
To highlight the dynamics of political competition within the parliament, we
also investigated the level of support in key votes according to the ‘colour’ of the
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Yes No Abstentions
Key Votes Other Votes
Figure 3. Average of Parliamentary Support in Key Votes (1994–2016)
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Note: Country of mission, year, chamber, with C and S standing for Chamber of Deputies and Senate, respectively.
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coalition in government. As reported in Figure 5, centre-left governments, com-
posed of the DS and La Margherita (and later the PD15), could sometimes rely on
centrist (CCD/CDU and their successor UDC score a level of support beyond 50%)
and even right-wing parties (FI/PdL and AN score an average of 57% and 37%
of ‘yes’, respectively). Only LN starkly opposed the centre-left’s operations. It is
also worth noting the different behaviour of the two extreme-left parties. While
the ‘loyal’ PdCI voted yes in all the observations, the ‘rebel’ RC registered 57%
support.
With the centre-right in government, the parliament is more clearly divided
along partisan lines (Figure 6). On the one hand, the four parties usually com-
posing the governing coalition provided strong and cohesive parliamentary sup-
port to the executive on military missions. In fact, FI, AN and LN presented almost
total support for centre-right-sponsored MOAs, while UDC surpassed 90% sup-
port. On the other hand, the centre-left opposition vigorously opposed them.
Specifically, the platform made up of the DS and La Margherita scored a limited
12.84% support and RC and PdCI together went further, with a null level of
support.16
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
RC PdCI DS/Mar-PD CDU/CCD-UDC FI-PdL AN LN
Yes No Abstentions
Figure 5. Average of Partisan Support in Key Votes (centre left in government)
Note: The number of observations varies slightly across parties: RC (7), PdCI (6), DS-La Margherita/PD (12), CCD-CDU/
UDC (8), FI-PdL (12), AN (8), LN (13).
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
RC/PdCI DS-Mar/PD UDC FI-PdL AN LN
Yes No Abstentions
Figure 6. Average of Partisan Support in Key Votes (centre right in government)
Note: The number of observations varies slightly across parties: RC/PdCI (14), DS-La Margherita/PD (15), UDC (15),
FI-PdL (15), AN (14), LN (15).
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Findings and debate
Our collected data allow an assessment of the selected arguments developed in the
literature on parties and foreign policy. Almost all the above-mentioned expecta-
tions on voting patterns have been corroborated by the empirical analysis in the
case of Italy, albeit with partial but notable distinctions.
First, the procedural features seem to be relevant in affecting the behaviour of
political parties towards the MOAs. In fact, we observed that the support for military
operations declines by around 12 points between all the votes and our selected
category of ‘key votes’. This gap, although small, may indicate that opposition
parties, when confronted with a ‘package’ of several missions to refund, tend to vote
in favour even though they are against one of them. This attitude has already been
found in the literature on specific cases (Bono 2005), but it has never been assessed
with a larger sample. However, this figure might also suggest that parties are more
prone to express their dissent in front of government representatives, a circumstance
that generates more visibility and media coverage for the vote, fostering audience
costs for the government (Coticchia and Moro 2017).
Second, according to our findings, the curvilinear model of partisan support for
military operations (Wagner et al. 2017) seems to better illustrate the case of Italy
than the ‘traditional left–right’ model proposed by Glenn Palmer et al. (2004).
Indeed, the level of support for troop deployment is very low among far-left parties
(PCI and RC); it increases for centre-left parties (DS-PDS) and reaches a peak
among centrist and centre-right parties (PD, CCD/CDU–UDC and FI). However,
differing slightly from the curvilinear model (Wagner et al. 2017), in the Italian
case the level of support by far-right parties is controversial. In fact, AN supported
all the military operations apart from the one in Kosovo.17 This difference may be
related to the nature of AN (Ignazi 1994) and to the recent evolution of far-right
parties in Europe (Mudde 2007). Indeed, AN was a ‘nationalist party’ that con-
ceived the deployment of armed forces abroad as a symbol of national pride. To the
contrary, nowadays far-right populist parties often take an isolationist stance on
security and defence policy (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015).
Third, the much-hypothesized bipartisan consensus on military operation
abroad (Ignazi et al. 2012) is confirmed by our data. In general, the extent of
parliamentary support has been extremely high, suggesting an almost permanent
agreement between the main parties of centre-left and centre-right. However, this
figure was quite high in key votes too, entailing that bipartisanship characterized
several military operations abroad. In particular, FI backed the centre-left coalition
in the case of operations Alba, Leonte, Prima Parthica and EUNAVFOR Med.18 On
its part, the centre-left party supported Italian involvement in the international
operation in Afghanistan after 2001.19 As far as parliamentary votes are concerned,
bipartisanship was instead (even if partially) broken on Kosovo, Iraq and Libya. In
the case of operation Allied Harbour, FI supported Italian participation in the
multilateral intervention during the debate but, by abstaining, signalled its oppo-
sition to the centre-left executive.20 On Antica Babilonia, in a fundamental vote in
the Chamber of Deputies, the centre-left abstained, sharing the humanitarian goal
of the mission, but it voted against Berlusconi’s government in all the other
debates.21 Finally, notwithstanding its relevant support in the Defence Committee,
12 Fabrizio Coticchia and Valerio Vignoli
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PD abstained on the centre-right cabinet’s decision to become involved in
Operation Unified Protector in Libya.22
A possible way to better understand the reasons behind these cases of con-
testation could be to look at the nature of the missions and at the salience the
parties attribute to the features of them. The aim of the operation, the types of
troops and military assets deployed, the kind of activities undertaken on the
ground (e.g. combat tasks, humanitarian rescue, peacekeeping, etc.), the number of
casualties and ‘collateral damage’, and the presence of a multilateral framework
(such as a United Nation Security Council (UNSC) resolution) could constitute
crucial variables affecting parties’ behaviour. At first glance, the UN multilateral
frameworks and non-combat operations especially seem to be correlated with a
high level of parliamentary support. For instance, on the one hand, the ‘bipartisan
operations’ in Albania and Lebanon both had the specific aim of providing stability
in areas of conflict without combat activities on the ground and were authorized by
UNSC resolutions. On the other hand, ‘politically contested’ military missions (e.g.
Iraq) had a strong combat component while the multilateral framework was
controversial.
Fourth, in line with existing literature (Wagner et al. 2017), the dynamics
of government–opposition are very relevant. Indeed (as illustrated by Figures 5
and 6), the voting patterns change greatly according to the current position of the
parties. Specific attention should be devoted to the parliamentary behaviour of far-
right and far-left parties. In ‘key votes’, LN and RC radically decreased their level of
support for MOAs as they moved from the government to the opposition. As long
as RC guaranteed ‘external support’ to the first Prodi centre-left government, it
agreed on several refinancing votes. However, after moving to the opposition
because of the disagreement with the main coalition partners on economic issues,
RC always voted against MOAs. Conversely, PdCI continued to back the gov-
ernment on military deployments. However, significant differences emerge in a
broader comparison between LN and RC. In fact, while the former never really
hijacked FI on MOAs, the latter was actually capable of defying the majority whip,
as occurred in the vote on Operation Alba. On the whole, while RC moved from
57% support to nil, LN astonishingly shifted from large support to almost nil.
While the party’s position in parliament (government/opposition) seems absolutely
crucial in the voting patterns of LN, ideological attitudes clearly play a role for RC
even when it has been a member of the ruling coalition. Indeed, contrary to LN, the
overall level of support of RC towards the MOAs has never been particularly high.
Finally, in line with the argument of a supposed ‘instrumentality’ of voting on
Italian foreign and defence policy (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Carbone 2007), the
findings illustrate how main opposition parties, despite an overall consensus on the
missions expressed several times in the parliament, aimed to defeat the government
before the assembly, exploiting divisions in the majority coalitions during ‘crucial
votes’, when the government had a slim margin of support. In other words, on
MOAs Italian parties have sometimes behaved as ‘office seekers’ rather than ‘policy
seekers’ (Lagassè and Mello 2018; Strøm 1990). For instance, in parliamentary
debates FI consistently backed the Italian contribution to Allied Harbour in
Kosovo in 1999. Nevertheless, when it came to debate the resolution by the
majority coalition, they twice voted against it.23 Moreover, this resonates with
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recent research (Oktay 2018) that has highlighted how weak executives can
overcome parliamentary resistance against security policy, engaging in logrolling
and offering side payments.
Conclusions
The article has sought to make a significant contribution to the current debate on
parliamentary war powers by examining how Italian parties voted on military
operations abroad in the post-Cold War era.
First, we have presented a detailed data set on Italian parliamentary votes on
military operations abroad since the end of the Cold War. Despite the literature
having started to investigate relations between Italian parties, parliaments and
military missions, with these issues empirically addressed by several studies
(Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Ignazi et al. 2009), a comprehensive data set on
parties’ voting patterns was still missing.
Second, our empirical analysis has contributed to the growing theoretical debate
on the relationship between partisanship, coalition politics, parliamentary over-
sight and foreign policy. Within such scholarly debate, we have devoted specific
attention to the consequences of parliamentary oversight, the curvilinear model of
the relationship between partisanship and foreign policy, the different votes
expressed by government parties and opposition parties, the supposed Italian
bipartisan consensus on military operations, and the domestic foundation of the
Italian votes on defence issues. In detail, the expectations derived from the lit-
erature on the curvilinear model of parliamentary support for military operations
on the left–right axis and ‘the bipartisanship defence policy hypotheses’ seem to be
confirmed, albeit with a peculiar distinction regarding far-right parties. We have
also found that the ‘instrumentality of the votes’ on foreign policy and the rela-
tionship between voting patterns and membership in majority coalition (despite
the difference among extreme parties) are crucial to properly understand the case
of Italy.
Recent changes in the law-making procedure, as well as the transforming
structure of the Italian party system, may limit the validity of our findings to the
time span selected. With the new law (n-145 2016), opposition parties are finally
able to discriminate between the various (groups of) operations. Thus, we can
expect that the number of total votes will significantly increase. On the other hand,
the 2018 elections saw the rise to government of two populist parties – the Five Star
Movement and Lega Nord – at the expense of the two main centre-left and centre-
right parties (PD and FI) (see Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2018). Thus, con-
sidering how convincingly centrist parties have supported military operations,
further research should determine whether ideological preferences might prevail
over the government–opposition dynamic.
Third, we have advanced some preliminary hypotheses that can be empirically
investigated, paving the way for further research. Three main aspects deserve
further study. First, the GAL–TAN cleavage (Hooghe et al. 2002) – rather than the
traditional left–right axis – could be tested in the case of Italy, assessing the
relevance of such dimension in defence policy. Second, the role of the financial
crisis on parliamentary support for military operations abroad should be further
14 Fabrizio Coticchia and Valerio Vignoli
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explored. At first glance, we can already notice a decrease in the number of key
votes since 2008, the year usually employed as a benchmark for the beginning of
the crisis. This may suggest that Italian governments have become more reluctant
to commit the country to costly and unpopular military operations abroad
(Battistelli et al. 2012). Finally, in line with the mounting scholarly attention on
populist parties, further studies may systematically examine the voting patterns on
MOAs of the Five Star Movement (Zulianello 2018), comparing its parliamentary
behaviour on this issue with other parties in Italy (e.g. with Lega Nord or Italia dei
Valori) and in Europe (e.g. with Podemos in Spain).
Acknowledgements. The authors would like to thank G. Cama, W. Wagner, F. Ostermann, L. De Sio,
E. Pizzimenti and all the participants of the Workshop ‘Political Parties and Foreign Policy’ (Genova,
2017), for their useful comments and suggestions.
Notes
1 For qualitative analyses on defence and voting patterns see Ignazi et al. (2012). All other studies on
voting and military missions have focused on a limited time span (e.g. a single mission or a comparison of
a limited number of debates).
2 An exception is Di Camillo and Tessari (2013).
3 ‘Legge Garofani’, 31 December 2016, Law 145 2016.
4 In juridical terms, the law decrees constitute a temporary act issued by the executive, which must be
converted into law within 60 days. Resolutions instead represent the positions of individual parties or a
group of them on the government’s conduct. They have no legal force. While law decrees were mostly used
for the refinancing of the missions, resolutions always concerned the main lines of foreign policy.
5 At the time of writing (August 2018) the parliament had voted three times on the missions. See: www.
camera.it/leg17/465?tema=deliberazione_del_consiglio_dei_ministri_del_14_gennaio_2017.
6 However, it is still not clear if ‘urgent provisions’ could be allowed in cases of emergency, bypassing with
a law decree the parliamentary control. See the law in detail: www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2016/08/
01/16G00159/sg.
7 The authors can provide additional information on the data set on request.
8 We retrieved the votes from the official reports of the sessions in the Chamber of Deputies and in the
Senate. These documents are available on the respective websites.
9 For a broader debate on the so-called ‘Second Republic’ see Cotta and Verzichelli (2008). On the Italian
democratic transition see Fabbrini and Gilbert (2000).
10 All law decrees approved prior to 2001 report only the nominal votes by MPs, often not even followed
by party affiliation. In these cases, we had to count each single vote and then attribute it to a political party.
11 In line with similar selection criteria adopted by current literature (Ignazi et al. 2012), we have
considered all the missions that involved at least 1,000 troops deployed at the same time, for a minimum of
five months. Consequently, we have excluded dozens of small and/or brief operations undertaken in the
last decades. A comprehensive list of the post-Cold War Italian interventions can be found at: www.difesa.
it/OperazioniMilitari/op_int_concluse/Pagine/default.aspx. The only exception to our criteria is the
operation(s) IFOR-SFOR-Althea in Bosnia. Despite the duration and the personnel employed, we did not
consider the operation because it was extremely complicated to distinguish the specific debates that
occurred in the very different phases of the mission, which indeed changed significantly over time in terms
of tasks and mandates.
12 Alba, Allied Harbour, UNIFIL, Prima Parthica and EUNAVFOR Med were promoted by centre-left
executives. Enduring Freedom, ISAF, Antica Babilonia and Unified Protector were launched by centre-
right governments. Fifteen votes occurred with a centre-right coalition in power and 12 when a left-wing
one was in power.
13 These figures were obtained by calculating the percentage of yes, no and abstentions on each of the 96
votes in the data set and, subsequently, calculating the respective averages.
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14 The period of substantial representation in parliament and, consequently, the number of observations
varies across the parties: RC (1994–2008, 66), PdCI (1998–2008, 51), DS (1994–2006, 57), PD (2006–16,
38) PPI/La Margherita (1994–2006, 58), CCD/CDU (1994–2001, 25), UDC (2001–13, 59), FI-PdL (1994–
2016, 96), AN (1994–2008, 66), LN (1994–2016, 96).
15 We decided to sum the votes of DS and La Margherita, establishing a continuity with PD (which is the
result of their merger) to increase the number of observations.
16 The two communist parties voted in the same way on the mission promoted by centre-right gov-
ernments and therefore are summed together in this figure.
17 AN, following FI, voted against the government’s resolution on 26 March 1999, abstained on 3 April
and again voted no on 19 May 1999.
18 In fact, in the case of Alba they voted in favour of the majority’s resolution in the Chamber of Deputies
on 8 April 1997 and abstained in the Senate the following day.
19 DS and La Margherita voted against the resolutions in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate on 9
October 2001, but they voted in favour of those approved in both chambers on 9 November 2001 and 3
October 2002.
20 Here we refer to the vote of 3 April 1999.
21 DS and La Margherita abstained, with a few defections, in the Chamber of Deputies on 15 April 2003.
They voted against the government in the same day in the Senate and in the votes that took place in both
chambers on 19 March and 20 May 2003.
22 24 March 2011, Chamber of Deputies.
23 FI voted against the centre-left resolution on 26 March 1999, abstained on 3 April 1999 and voted
against on 19 May 1999.
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